We study a supply chain with one supplier and many retailers that face exogenous endcustomer demands. The supplier and the retailers all try to minimize their own inventory-related costs. In contrast to the retailers' newsvendor type ordering behavior (under which retailers may place orders freely in every period), we propose two scheduled ordering policies: Scheduled Balanced Ordering Policy (SBOP) and Scheduled Synchronized Ordering Policy (SSOP). Under both SBOP and SSOP, retailers are allowed to order freely only in one period of an ordering cycle, and receive fixed shipments in other periods. However, SBOP is different from SSOP in that, retailers take turns to order freely under SBOP, while under SSOP, all retailers order freely in the same period. With the average supply chain cost per period as the performance measure, we identify mathematical conditions under which the scheduled ordering policies outperform the newsvendor type ordering. Through a large scale numerical study, we find that scheduled ordering policies are most effective when (i) the supplier's holding and expediting costs are high; (ii) the end-customer demand correlation is high; and (iii) the supplier's capacity is high. Further, we find that the performance of the scheduled ordering policies is fairly close to one another for different magnitudes of the end-customer demand variance. In addition, we observe that the behavior of SSOP often complements that of SBOP. While SBOP is better than SSOP when the supplier's capacity is low and when the end-customer demand correlation level is high, SSOP is better when the opposite conditions hold.
Introduction
Fierce competition in the current business environment has made firms realize that the competition is more of a supply chain versus supply chain model rather than the classically accepted company versus company model (Bradley and Thomas, 1999) . Consequently, as argued by Chopra and Meindl (2006) , "supply chain success should be measured in terms of supply chain profitability and not in terms of the profits at an individual stage," it is important to focus on the efficiency of the whole supply chain. It is this efficiency that ultimately determines how much the end-customer pays.
In fact, it is not an overstatement to say that supply chains are irrelevant to the end-customers. All the contract negotiations and careful synchronization of deliveries among the supply chain parties do not matter to them. It is all about which retailer (as the final stage of the associated supply chain) can provide them the best products at the lowest price. Supply chains that recognize this will make the necessary changes to meet these end-customer demands and will succeed in attracting end-customers. Those that do not will lose out and face the potential of failure. Recognizing this, we propose innovative strategies for improving the performance of distribution supply chains.
We focus on distribution supply chains since almost every company faces the challenges associated with distributing its products. Distribution supply chains, for example in the U.S., are especially prevalent in the 3.8 Trillion retail sector, and it is estimated that distribution expenses often exceed ten percent of a company's gross sales (Hudson 2003) . The retail sector is notorious for intense competition with razor thin margins and firms are compelled to identify innovative ways to improve the efficiency of their distribution systems, and to gain a competitive edge. In spite of In the supply chain management literature, there are several articles that focus their attention on serial supply chains (Clark and Scarf (1960) , Axsater (1993), Bollapragada et al. (2004) , Parker and Kapuscinski (2004) ) and on assembly supply chains (Schmidt and Nahmias (1985) , Rosling (1989) , Decroix and Zipkin (2005) , Zhang (2006) ). On the subject of distribution supply chains, although there is a large literature, the results are less complete and robust than for those simpler systems.
Some representative work includes Schwarz (1973) , Eppen and Schrage (1981) , Federgruen and Zipkin (1984) , Jackson (1988) , Graves (1996) . More recent work includes Gurnani (2001) , which studied quantity discount pricing structures that encourage the buyers to coordinate or consolidate the timing of their orders, and eventually reduce the total system costs under certain conditions. Zhang (2005) examined the impact of transshipment on the supply chain members' performance. Gullu et al. (2005) analyzed a decentralized supply chain where there exists partial cooperation between the two retailers. They derived unique equilibrium order-up-to levels for the retailers under mild conditions. Goel and Gutierrez (2007) studied how the price difference between the spot and future commodity markets can be utilized to enhance the efficacy of the supply chain through better procurement and distribution policies.
We add to this growing literature by analyzing the effectiveness of scheduled order policies in improving the efficiency of decentralized distribution supply chains. Though arguably not as efficient as centralized systems, decentralized inventory control is still widely in use in practice, as retailers fear to lose the control and flexibility if switching to centralized control. Firms still using decentralized control have been trying to find ways to smooth the flow of materials and information in the system. Recently, strategies that encourage the retailers to follow a mutually agreed upon ordering pattern have become popular. For example, Grillers Pride (http://www.grillerspride.com), a Glatt Kosher Meat & Poultry Butchery that serves Atlanta and the Southeast of the US, divides their customers into groups according to geographical location (zip code). Products are delivered to each group on a separate day of the week. As another example, GATX, a third party logistics company that serves 6500 BP and Chevron service stations, divides the service stations into 5 groups, each of which is required to order only on a preassigned day of the week. So 20% of the service stations order on Monday, another 20% order on Tuesday, etc. (Andel 1995) .
Such retailer ordering patterns, known as scheduled ordering policies, were first studied by Lee et al. (1997) and Cachon (1999) . They characterized them into three types, namely randomized, balanced, and synchronized. Under the randomized policy, the retailers are free to place an order whenever they want. When using the balanced policy, the retailers are evenly spaced out and they are only allowed to place an order when their turn comes. On the other hand, under the synchronized policy, all the retailers place orders at the same time. Both Lee et al. (1997) and Cachon (1999) showed that a balanced ordering policy was better than the synchronized policy. Lee et al. (1997) also showed that synchronized policy was worse than the randomized policy.
While Lee et al. (1997) concentrated on analyzing the scheduled ordering policies in terms of the supplier's demand variance, Cachon (1999) placed emphasis on how the retailers' oder interval length and their batch size impact the supply chain performance. However, both papers did not mathematically compare the performance of the three policies from the perspective of the total supply chain. They also failed to incorporate information sharing and placed emphasis on supply chains in which the retailers incur significant fixed ordering costs.
Different from those in Lee et al. (1997) and Cachon (1999) , here we look at a supply chain where there is no fixed ordering cost involved. While fixed ordering cost is a big concern for some companies when making inventory replenishment decisions, it is not for others, either because it is very low compared to other inventory related costs, or due to the nature of the business. For example, Farnell UK (http://uk.farnell.com), an electronic components distributor, provides free same day dispatching (next day delivery) and charges very low shipping cost even if faster delivery is requested. Another electronic components distributor, Mouser Electronics (http://www.mouser.com), charges no handling fee and very low shipping cost. These companies make fixed cost a very minor concern for retailers. As a result, retailers are ready to order and receive shipment in every period.
We model such a situation.
In comparison to the Free Ordering Policy (FOP) where retailers may order freely in every period, we evaluate the following two scheduled ordering policies:
Scheduled Balanced Ordering Policy (SBOP) This policy operates with an ordering cycle of m periods. In every period, n retailers are allowed to order freely. Each retailer may order freely only in one period of a cycle. In the remaining periods of the cycle, a predetermined fixed quantity δ is shipped to him.
Scheduled Synchronized Ordering Policy (SSOP)
This policy also operates with an ordering cycle of m periods. Different from SBOP, here all the retailers are scheduled to order freely in the same and only one period of a cycle. In the remaining periods of the cycle, each retailer receives a predetermined fixed quantity δ.
We are specifically interested in studying whether these two scheduled ordering policies can be effective in reducing the total supply chain cost. We also identify conditions under which these policies are especially effective when compared to FOP. Finally we aim to understand which of the two scheduled ordering policies is better. Our mathematical analysis and the accompanying computational study provides interesting insights into the behavior of the scheduled ordering policies.
When comparing them to FOP, the behavior of SSOP is not that different from that of SBOP.
However, the philosophy behind SSOP is very different from the rationale behind SBOP. As a result, our results show that the behavior of SSOP very nicely complements that of SBOP. We show that higher supplier capacity and independent demand are conducive to SSOP effectiveness whereas the opposite conditions are conducive to SBOP effectiveness. Before presenting the model and analysis, we first briefly summarize our contributions to research. Using the average total supply chain cost per period as the performance measure, we establish easy-to-use mathematical conditions which can determine when SBOP and SSOP outperform FOP, and corroborate them with results from an extensive computational study. We examine how different supply chain parameters impact the performance of SBOP and SSOP. Through an extensive numerical study, we find that SBOP and SSOP are better than FOP when (i) the supplier's holding and expediting costs are high; (ii) the end-customer demand correlation is high; and (iii) the supplier has a high capacity level. Further, we find that the performance of SBOP and SSOP changes little for different magnitudes of the end-customer demand variability. We also mathematically compare the performances of the two scheduled ordering policies -SBOP and SSOPand find that, in contrast to Lee et al. (1997) and Cachon (1999) , under some conditions SSOP can actually perform better than SBOP. Our numerical study shows that when SSOP is effective (compared to FOP), it outperforms SBOP 92.17% of the time.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we formulate the problem and provide some basic structural analysis. In Section 3 we develop the mathematical conditions under which SBOP and SSOP are superior than FOP, and also mathematically compare the performances of SBOP and SSOP. In Section 4, we conduct an extensive numerical study and examine how the performance of SBOP and SSOP changes with different supply chain parameters. In Section 5, we discuss some open issues related to our research. In Section 6 we summarize the paper and provide some concluding marks.
Problem Formulation and Structural Analysis

Problem Description
We study a distribution supply chain with one supplier serving N identical retailers facing endcustomer demands, each of which minimizes their own cost. To differentiate the end-customer demand that the retailers face, we refer to the demand that the supplier faces as retailer demand.
The end-customer demands are assumed to be iid over time, but can be correlated across the retailers. The supplier faces a holding cost of h s per unit of inventory, and an expediting cost of π s per unit of unmet retailer demand. (It will be made clear what this expediting cost is later in the paper). Each retailer incurs a unit holding cost of h r and a unit backorder cost of π r . The retailers do not incur fixed ordering cost, and so traditionally they can place orders freely in every period. We consider both the cases with and without information sharing. By information sharing, we mean the supplier knows all the past realized end-customer demands.
In every period, the sequence of the events is as follows: (a) the supplier receives the units produced in the previous period; (b) the retailers place orders if they can in that period; (c) if the supplier does not have enough inventory to fulfill all retailer demand, she gets the product from an outside source immediately at a higher expediting cost; (d) the supplier ships the product to every retailer, either at the quantity the retailer selects or the fixed shipment δ; (e) the supplier decides how much to produce in this period; (f) the end-customer demands occur and the retailers satisfy the demands as much as possible with their on-hand inventory. Unsatisfied demand at the retailers is backlogged; (g) inventory-related costs (holding costs for the supplier and the retailers, backorder costs for the retailers and expediting costs for the supplier) are tabulated.
We can see that retailers will incur higher costs under SBOP and SSOP than they do under FOP, since they are not able to order what is best for them every period. Hence the benefit of SBOP and SSOP, if any, will only come from the supplier side. The question is whether SBOP and SSOP can reduce the total supply chain cost. If yes, then the supplier may transfer part of the benefit to the retailers -by doing so, retailers will be more willing to follow scheduled orderingso that all parties will be better off.
Intuitively, fixing the retailers' order amount in certain periods may reduce the demand variability faced by the supplier, and different scheduled ordering may lead to different degrees of variability reduction. Let us first take a look at how SBOP and SSOP can possibly be effective by considering a supply chain with one supplier and two retailers. In this example, the end-customer demands are iid, and there is information sharing. Figure 1 Under FOP, in each period the retailer demand is equal to the sum of the end-customer demands incurred at the two retailers, which are assumed to be independent. Hence the standard deviation faced by the supplier is √ 2σ, where σ is the standard deviation of the end-customer demand.
Under SBOP, in every period the retailer demand can be decomposed into the following two parts. In performing a more rigorous analysis than the above, we make the following assumptions:
(i) The production at the supplier takes one period, which means one period of lead time; (ii)
The supplier has infinite capacity; (iii) The supplier fulfills all retailer orders every period. If the supplier does not have enough inventory on hand, she will get the product from an outside source immediately at a higher expediting cost, and then ship it to the retailers right away. This implies a high service standard at the supplier side. (Gavirneni et al. (1999) and Lee et al. (2000) also made the same assumption.) As a real example, the Florida Dairy Marketing Cooperative (FDMC) that provides farm or unprocessed milk to fluid milk processors, buys unprocessed milk when it is unable to maintain optimal inventory levels from local member production (Glenn et al., 2001)); (iv) The retailers receive their shipments immediately.
Model Formulation
The end-customer demand that retailer i faces in period j of a cycle is assumed to be D i,j . We will use a generic random variable D to refer to any D i,j . d i,j is the realization of the random demand D i,j . The demand that the supplier faces in every period is denoted as ξ. Let Ψ Z (z) and
, s} be the order-up-to levels for the retailers and the supplier respectively. Throughout the paper, subscripts f , b, and s correspond to FOP, SBOP, and SSOP respectively. We will formulate the problem for the information sharing case. When there is no information sharing, we may modify the models by replacing the demand realization d i,j with the random demand D i,j .
Free Ordering Policy
It is optimal for the retailers to use a stationary order-up-to policy, because they can order freely in every period under FOP, and the end-customer demand is stationary. Consequently, the endcustomer demands will be transmitted to the supplier unaltered and it is also optimal for the supplier to use a stationary order-up-to policy. Both the supplier and the retailers have newsvendor solutions. It is well established that the optimal order-up-to level y * f for the retailer satisfies the relation:
and the optimal order-up-to level Y * f for the supplier is:
where ξ is the sum of N identical end-customer demands from the distribution Ψ D .
Scheduled Balanced Ordering Policy
Retailers' Problem Without loss of generality, we define the period that a retailer can order freely as the first period of a cycle for him. Assume that at the beginning of any cycle, the retailer's inventory level is y b . In the next m − 1 periods, he agrees to receive a fixed shipment δ in every period. The one cycle cost l(y b ) for the retailer i given an inventory level of y b is
The cost-to-go function for the remaining t cycles is
Supplier's Problem At the beginning of every period (say s) when the supplier makes the production decision, she is anticipating a retailer order at the beginning of next period, which can be decomposed into two parts. The first part is the fixed shipment to all the retailers that cannot order freely, n(m − 1)δ. The second part is from the retailers that can order freely, each of which will make an order equal to the inventory reduction over the periods since his last "free" ordering epoch. Note that because of information sharing, all past end-customer demands (up till the beginning of period s) at every "free" retailer are known to the supplier. The end-customer demands unknown to the supplier (at the beginning of period s) correspond to the ones in the last period of an ordering cycle at these "free" retailers, i.e., the demand in period s. Because the end-customer demand is stationary, retailers will use a stationary order-up-to level. This implies the demand from each "free" retailer is equal to inventory reduction at that retailer between two free-order epochs, which is (
Without loss of generality, we number the retailers next-to-order freely as retailer 1 to retailer n, and so the demand faced by the supplier
The one-period cost for the supplier given
The cost-to-go function for the remaining t periods is
Scheduled Synchronized Ordering Policy
Retailers' Problem Note that for the retailers, the cost expression under SSOP is same as the one under SBOP. For this reason we do not reiterate the formulas. But bear in mind that here we will use a different decision variable y s to differentiate y b used in the SBOP scenario.
Supplier's Problem Under SSOP, in the periods that all the retailers order freely, the supplier
given inventory level Y s and D i,m , i = 1, ..., m, the supplier's one cycle cost is
Note that the first two items correspond to the holding and expediting costs in the period when the retailers can order freely, and the last item corresponds to the holding cost in the remaining periods of a cycle when the retailers receive fixed shipments. Only holding cost but not expediting cost can be incurred by the supplier during those non-free ordering periods, because there is no demand uncertainty in those periods and the supplier can produce enough to satisfy the retailer demand, yet there is always a possibility of inventory carry over from previous periods.
y s and Y s respectively, and therefore order-up-to policies are optimal. With capacity limit, modified order-up-to policies are optimal.
Proof: The proof follows from standard induction (Hadley and Whitin (1963) ).
Analytical Results
For tractability reasons, we make the "regeneration assumption" which, under SBOP and SSOP, allows the retailers to return unwanted product to the supplier at no cost. Lee, So, and Tang (2000) also made such an assumption. This assumption ensures the regeneration of the system in every cycle, and therefore the average cost per cycle is equivalent to the one-cycle cost. Notice that the retailers will return the products only if they have inventory levels higher than y * b (or y * s for SSOP).
The probability of this happening is often quite small. Consider a supply chain with two retailers as an example. If the fixed shipment quantity δ is the mean end-customer demand, then for the end-customer demand that has different erlang distributions with parameters (1, 20) , (2, 10) , (4, 5) , and (8, 2.5), the probability of a retailer returning the product to the supplier is 0.26, 0.14, 0.05 and 0.008 respectively, and the average returned quantity is 10%, 3.5%, 0.8%, 0.07% of the fixed shipment respectively. We evaluated the impact of this assumption in our computational study and observed that on average the total supply chain cost with this assumption is different from the cost without this assumption only by 2.34% (1.97%) for SBOP (SSOP).
Notice that in Equation (1) the third term is an obstacle for mathematical analysis. We did some analysis and observed that it is usually of low magnitude. Note that high supplier expediting cost and high end-customer demand correlation represent a scenario that will most likely result in the inventory carry-over, since these two conditions require the supplier to replenish to a higher inventory level. In a simulation where h s = 1, π s = 99, N = 3, the end-customer demands are perfectly correlated and follow an exponential distribution with mean equal to 20, we find that the frequency of the carry-over inventory greater than 0 is only one out of the 3600 cases. Thus from now on, when we look at the supplier's one cycle cost under SSOP, we will deal withL instead of
Average Cost
Since all the retailers are identical, the average cost per period of all the retailers under SBOP (same for SSOP, only with c s and y s as the notation) is as follows:
With the regeneration assumption, the supplier's average cost per period under SBOP is
and the supplier's average cost per period under SSOP is
Proposition 1 Under both SBOP and SSOP, the optimal fixed shipment quantity δ chosen by solely minimizing the retailers' costs also minimizes the total supply chain cost.
Proof: By (3) we can see that under SBOP, the supplier's cost is not impacted by the choice of δ.
Therefore the optimizing δ for the retailers is also optimal for the whole supply chain.
Under SSOP, the retailers' costs are inter-related to the supplier's only through the fixed shipment quantity δ * . By equation (4), we can see that the supplier's cost is determined by a z = Y s + N (m − 1)δ, but not affected by the specific individual value of Y s or δ. Hence in minimizing the system cost, the optimization problem can actually be decomposed into two problems, one that determines δ * and y * s that are best for the retailers, and the other that determines z * = Y * s + N (m − 1)δ * that optimizes the supplier's cost. In other words, the best thing for the system to do is, to find an optimal δ * that minimizes retailer's cost (which can be done solely by the retailer), and then adjust Y * s based on δ * .
Special Case: Two Retailers
In this section, we will focus on a supply chain with one supplier and two retailers. For consistency of comparison between the different ordering policies, we will consider the case where the cycle length is equal to the number of retailers, i.e., m = N = 2. The end-customer demand is assumed to be exponentially distributed with mean 1 λ and cdf Ψ(z) = 1 − e −λz .
For ease of exposition, we will only discuss the case with information sharing in the main paper.
For the case without information sharing, we will present the results in the online supplement.
Given the information sharing setting, we will consider two different scenarios, i.e., independent and perfectly correlated end-customer demand.
Notice that for all the three ordering strategies (FOP, SBOP, and SSOP), the retailer's cost is the same for independent and perfectly correlated demand. It is also the same with and without information sharing. This is because information sharing and demand correlation will only impact the supplier.
Retailer's Average Cost under FOP
For any retailer, it has a standard newsvendor problem solution and the average cost per period is
Let y * f be the optimal order quantity for any retailer. It is well known that y *
. And the loss function is
.
Plugging y f * back into equation (5), we have
Supplier's Average Cost under FOP
Independent Demand
When the retailers use stationary order-up-to policies, the end-customer demands are transmitted unchanged to the supplier through retailer orders. Thus in every period the supplier faces a cumulative of N (here N = 2) iid exponentially distributed end-customer demands.
in any period (j = 1 since the cycle length under FOP is implicitly one period) has a Gamma distribution with parameters (2, λ) and cdf Ψ ξ (z) = 1 − λze −λz − e −λz .
The supplier also has a newsvendor problem solution and her average cost per period is
Let Y * f be the supplier's optimal order-up-to level. Similarly we have Ψ ξ (Y * f ) = πs πs+hs . Thus
and the loss function is
Plugging Y * f back into (6), we have the supplier's average cost as
Perfectly Correlated Demand
When the end-customer demands are perfectly correlated, the demand that the supplier faces,
, is exponentially distributed with a mean of 2 λ . We can verify that the supplier's average cost is
Retailer's Average Cost under SBOP and SSOP
Since under both SBOP and SSOP, the system optimal δ can be chosen by minimizing the retailers' cost, we will incur same retailer costs under SBOP and SSOP. Here we will just present the results using SBOP as an example. As discussed at the beginning of Section 3, a retailer's average cost per cycle (2c b in this case since the cycle length is two periods) is equivalent to the one-cycle cost.
So for a given fixed shipment quantity δ, the average cost per cycle for any retailer i is
For any given constant δ, the optimal order-up-to level y * b satisfies at least for one period, and then do the best in the second period by picking an optimal z * . δ * therefore can be just determined by the choices of y * b and z * . 
Theorem 2 Let
which gives us
Given y * b and δ * , we have the optimal average cost as follows:
So far we have developed the average cost per cycle for one retailer. Because here the number of retailers is equal to the cycle length, the average cost per period of all retailers is equal to one retailer's average cost per cycle (2c b ).
Let α = 1 − ln( hr πr+hr ) + λδ * . By (9) we have α = e λδ * , and
Also let β = λY * f + 1, then by (7), we have
Proposition 3 For α and β defined in equations (10) and (11), we have
(ii) − ln( 
Supplier's Average Cost under SBOP
Under SBOP, the supplier's average cost is indifferent between the two cases when the end-customer demands are independent and when they are correlated. This is because, the demand variability faced by the supplier originates from the end-customer demands at one retailer over multiple periods, which are assumed to be independent over time.
We say the supplier is in state k if the retailer next to order has an inventory level of y b * − k before the arrival of the fixed shipment. Note that k is the realized end-customer demand for the retailer next to order and hence non-negative. By the discussion in Section 2.2.2, we know that the supplier faces a demand of ξ = (k + D i,2 − δ) + + δ if retailer i is the next one to order freely. With
The supplier's average cost is given by
The optimal order quantity Y *
πs+hs , and
Plugging Y * b back into equation (12), we can verify that the supplier's average cost is
Supplier's Average Cost under SSOP
Under SSOP, it is necessary to differentiate the cases when the end-customer demands are independent and perfectly correlated, which is different from under SBOP. This is because, unlike under SBOP, where the demand variability faced by the supplier in every period originates from one retailer, here under SSOP, the demand randomness comes from both retailers.
Independent Demand
We say the supplier is in state (u, v) if the two retailers to order freely have inventory levels of 
Given δ * satisfying (9), we will have Y * s satisfy
So we have
Notice that λ(Y * s + 2δ * − u − v) + 1 = β. With δ * and Y * s satisfying (9) and (14), we can compute the supplier's average cost as:
Perfectly Correlated Demand
Now in (13) 
With Y * s satisfying (15), we compute the supplier's average cost per period as
We will summarize the supplier and the retailers' respective average costs under different scenarios in Table 1   Table 1 The difference of the total supply chain's average cost between the SBOP and the FOP is
The implication behind Theorem 3 is: assuming identical holding costs for the supplier and retailers, when π s > π r , the cost reduction at the supplier is higher than the cost increase at the retailers under SBOP. Hence the total supply chain cost is reduced.
Theorem 4 When the end-customer demands across the retailers are perfectly correlated and there is information sharing in the supply chain, if (
Proof: By Theorem 4, we can see that the region that SBOP is effective when the end-customer demands are perfectly correlated is larger than (covers) the one for independent demand. This is because when end-customer demands are perfectly correlated, SBOP is more effective in reducing the demand variability faced by the supplier. 
Proof:
From Theorem 5, we can see that the higher π s is, the more likely SSOP is effective. This is not hard to understand because, higher π s implies larger saving achieved at the supplier by using SSOP. Theorem 3 to 6 give sufficient but not necessary conditions for SBOP and SSOP to be effective.
So the potential effective regions can be even larger. Nonetheless, these theorems provide easy to evaluate conditions and general guidelines for implementing scheduled ordering policies.
SSOP Versus SBOP
So far we have provided the mathematical conditions under which SBOP and SSOP are performing better than FOP in a two-retailer supply chain. In this section we will examine if one scheduled ordering policy of the two (SBOP and SSOP) is superior than the other, and if yes, under what conditions. Remember that the retailers incur the same cost under SBOP and SSOP. Therefore, we just need to compare the supplier's costs.
Theorem 7 When end-customer demands are independent and there is information sharing, then
C s ≤ C b , i.
e., SSOP outperforms SBOP.
Proof: When end-customer demands are independent, by 3.2.4, we know the supplier's cost under SBOP is
We also know from Section 3.2.5 that the supplier's cost under SSOP is 
Numerical Study
Up till now we have mathematically analyzed the performance of the two scheduled ordering policies.
In this section, we will conduct an extensive numerical study to examine While in the mathematical analysis we make a few assumptions, we drop all of them here. In the numerical study, everything operates as how it would in real life. There is no regeneration assumption. For SSOP, the carry-over inventory cost is also tabulated for the supplier. Further, the number of retailers is not restricted to two. However, due to the long computation time needed to find an optimal cycle length, we examine the performance of SBOP and SSOP for the case where the cycle length is equal to the number of retailers. In Section 4.3, we conduct a simulation to examine how the performance of SBOP and SSOP is impacted by the cycle length.
It is very hard to find closed form solutions for the optimal order-up-to levels and their associated costs. So we use IPA (Infinitesimal Purtabation Analysis) to compute the optimal order-up-to levels.
The validation and implementation of IPA would be similar to Kapuscinski and Tayur (1998) . More details on the IPA procedures can be found in Glasserman and Tayur (1995) .
To cover the cases when SBOP (SSOP) is effective and when it is not, we test a wide range of supply chain parameter combinations. We fix h r = 1 and π r = 9 1 . The supplier's holding cost and expediting cost can be any value of the following sets respectively: h s = {0.5, 0.75, 1, 1.25} and will focus on the information sharing case, since the general insights we obtain without information sharing remains the same.
We compute the percentage cost difference between the different ordering policies as
where i belong to the set {b, s}.
For example, the bigger the ∆ f s is, the better the SSOP performs. Given the different values of the supply chain parameters, we tested 1, 280 different combinations. In reporting the results, we take the average over all the experiments related to a specific level of the parameter on which we are focused. For example, if we want to see the performance of SSOP when the number of retailers is 5, we take an average of the percentage cost differences over all the 320 experiments in which the number of retailers is 5.
Discrepancy between Mathematical and Numerical Evidence
Since we earlier developed the mathematical conditions based on the regeneration assumption, we want to examine in the numerical study how often the following cases happen: (1) Among the four scenarios (YY, NY, YN, NN), "YN" is considered bad. This is because, the only reason that can result in "YN" is the regeneration assumption. The appearance of "YN" indicates that the regeneration assumption may generate over-optimistic mathematical conditions. However,
we can see that the number of instances that belongs to category "YN" is 0, for both SBOP and SSOP. Note that there is a large portion of the instances that fall in category "NY". This is not very surprising, because the conditions we provided are sufficient but not necessary ones. However, compared to the average cost reduction (which is 16.90% for SBOP and 18.31% for SSOP) of the instances in category YY, the average cost reduction of those in category "NY" is only 8.19% for SBOP and 9.28%. So we can see that the mathematical conditions we developed are quite useful because they predict a significant improvement due to implementing scheduled ordering policies.
Effectiveness of SSOP and SBOP
We observe that among the 1, 280 instances we tested, SBOP is effective 66.56% of the time and SSOP is effective 78.83% of the time. Figure 2 shows the histogram of the percentage cost reduction over all the experiments of interest. Compared to FOP, the cost reduction by using SBOP can be as high as 39.28% with an average of 13.55%. And the cost reduction by using SSOP can be as high as 42.99% with an average of 15.85%
We also observe that among all the 1009 instances that SSOP is effective, SSOP outperforms SBOP 92.17% of the time. By switching from SBOP to SSOP, the cost can be further reduced by as high as 18.57% with an average of 4.00%.
Note that in both the mathematical analysis and the numerical study, we show that SSOP can be better than FOP, and SSOP can also be better than SBOP, which is different from the observation in Cachon (1999) and Lee et al. (1997) . Clearly, information sharing played a role (especially in determining the magnitudes of the benefits) in these results, but we cannot clearly distinguish its role due to the very different supply chain setup we study. We believe that information sharing enables the supplier to see much lower variance in the demands she faces, which leads to increased savings at her location resulting in the fact that these scheduled ordering policies are effective more often than was observed by Cachon (1999) and Lee et al. (1997) . We will next discuss how the performance of SBOP and SSOP change with different supply chain parameters. It is easy to see that SBOP and SSOP will perform better as h s and π s increase.
We therefore focus our attention only on other parameters. Effect of the Demand Correlation: Figure 4 shows that when the demand correlation increases, the performance of SBOP and SSOP is getting better. The cost reduction can be as high as 18.45% (16.97%) for SBOP (SSOP). This is because, the main benefit of SBOP and SSOP is reducing the average demand variance faced by the supplier. When the end-customer demand correlation level is higher, this benefit is more significant. For example, if we have "N = 3, h s = 1, π s = 39, and Erlang (2, 10)," then by using SBOP the supplier's cost is reduced by −4.69% when ρ = 0 and by 27.50%
Effect of End-Customer
when ρ = 1. We also observe that SSOP is better than SBOP when the demand correlation level is relatively low, and the opposite holds when the demand is highly correlated. This is probably because when the end-customer demand is highly correlated, the risk pooling of SSOP results in a more significant demand variability surge in the free-ordering periods. Consequently, on average the demand variability per period faced by the supplier will be higher than that if SBOP is used, where the demand variability is more evenly distributed and is not effected by the demand correlation level. Thus we conclude that SBOP and SSOP are more effective than FOP when the end-customer demands have higher correlation. Further, SSOP is better than SBOP when the demand correlation level is low and SBOP is preferred for highly correlated demand. Effect of Capacity Limit: We conducted a small scale simulation to study the effect of the capacity limit. Here we have h r = h s = 1, π r = 9, π s = 39, ρ = 0.5, the end-customer demand follows an erlang distribution with parameters (2, 10) . The number of retailers is equal to 2. Because of the capacity limit, the supplier might need to produce extra in those non-free ordering periods just to ensure the optimal order quantity can be achieved in the free-ordering period. We use a heuristic (similar to the one in Gavirneni (2001) ) to calculate how much should be produced in those non-free ordering periods. As we mentioned in Section 2.2.2, we define the first period of an ordering cycle as the free-ordering period. So the periods for back production will be in the previous cycle, and we define them as period −m, −m + 1, ..., −2. On top of the fixed shipments, the extra quantity the supplier needs to produce in those periods is defined as z −i , i = {m, m − 1, ..., 2}. Let χ be the capacity limit. Our heuristic is to let Figure 5 shows that the both SBOP and SSOP perform better as the supplier's capacity gets higher. This is because when the supplier has higher capacity, both SBOP and SSOP are able to more efficiently reduce the demand variability faced by the supplier. Also notice that when the capacity limit is loose, SSOP performs better than the SBOP. However when the capacity limit is tight, then the SSOP performs worse than the SBOP. The reason is probably as follows. When the capacity limit is loose, the SSOP greatly reduces the average demand variance the supplier faces by pooling the demand risk into certain periods and leave other periods free. However, when the capacity limit is tight, pooling all the demand risk into certain periods is a bad idea since the supplier may not react well to the high demand surge in those specific periods because of the capacity limit. It thus results in huge expediting cost, which cannot be compensated by being riskfree in other periods. We conclude that both SSOP and SBOP will perform better when the supplier has a higher capacity. While SSOP may be preferred when the supplier has a higher capacity, SBOP is the better choice when the capacity limit is tight.
Optimal Cycle Length
The mathematical conditions of SBOP and SSOP being effective and the numerical results we analyzed so far are based on the assumption that the cycle length is equal to the number of retailers. However this is not necessarily the best choice for the cycle length. In this section, Figure 6 shows that, the performance of both SBOP and SSOP has an approximately concave pattern w.r.t. the cycle length. It first gets better and then worse as the cycle length increases. The reason probably is as follows. When the cycle length is small, the average demand variance the supplier faces is still quite high. So the benefit of scheduled ordering policies is not that significant. However, when the cycle length is too high, although the supplier's average demand variance is reduced a lot, the retailer incurs a very large cost, which cannot be compensated by the cost reduction at the supplier. Therefore a medium cycle length appears to be the best choice. 
Discussion on Assumptions and Some Open Issues
Impact of the Regeneration Assumption. We develop the mathematical results based on the regeneration assumption in Section 3. To check the impact of the regeneration assumption, we examine how much the cost difference is between the cases with and without it. We tested all the combinations of the parameters found that, on average over the 1280 instances, the difference of the total supply chain costs per period with and without this assumption is 2.34% for SBOP and 1.97% for SSOP. Further, the results in Section 4.1 also indicate that this regeneration assumption has little impact on our mathematical analysis. We thus conclude that the mathematical conditions we developed based on the regeneration assumption represent the true conditions well.
Expediting or Backlogging at the Supplier? Our paper conducts the analysis for the scenario that when the supplier does not have enough inventory to satisfy all the retailer orders, she will get the product from an outside source immediately at a higher expediting cost. It is, however, also possible that the supplier chooses to allocate her limited inventory among the retailers and backlog some of the retailer orders. We believe both approaches (expediting and backlogging) are practiced in industry. While whether the supplier should adopt expediting or backlogging itself is an open question beyond the scope of our paper, we still conduct a simulation to see if the scheduled ordering policies are more effective under one scenario than the other, in the hope of providing more insights on the use of SBOP and SSOP.
The simulation is conducted for all the 1280 instances. In the simulation for the backlogging case, we used the lexicographic allocation rule (Cachon and Lariviere (1999) ). Our results show that all the observations we made under expediting still hold here. We also find that for SBOP, the average cost reduction is 4.50% under expediting and 5.45% under backlogging. 57.18% of the time the benefit of SBOP is more significant under backlogging than it is under expediting, which, often happens when the supplier's penalty cost is small. This is probably because, the smaller the supplier's penalty cost is, the less incentive the supplier has to carry high inventory to satisfy all retailer demand. Consequently, this results in a less efficient supply chain to begin with under backlogging than expediting. Therefore SBOP is more effective under backlogging than expediting when the supplier's penalty cost is small.
For SSOP, our simulation shows that backlogging is always worse than expediting. The reason is as follows. The risk pooling of SSOP will result in supplier backlogging large retailer demand in the free-ordering periods. Consequently, the retailers will incur large backorder costs because there is no sufficient inventory to satisfy the end-customer demand.
Positive Leadtime. In our analysis, we are looking at a special case where the retailers will receive the product right away and the supplier gets the product one period after her inventory replenishment decision is made. Although we believe the modelling framework will be the same if we have positive leadtimes, we do recognize that the leadtime can have an impact on the performance of scheduled ordering policies and therefore conduct a simulation to study the effect. Our simulation results show that the observations we made under our assumption on leadtimes still hold here with positive leadtimes. Further, in a simulation where N = 2, h r = h s = 1, π r = 9, π s = 39, ρ = 0.5, and the end-customer demand follows an erlang distribution with parameters (2, 10), we find that the performance of both SBOP and SSOP gets better when the retailers' leadtime increases and when the supplier's leadtime decreases. This is because, the supplier will incur higher cost when her leadtime increases and therefore the scheduled ordering policies will get less effective. On the other hand, when the retailers' leadtime is higher, the retailer orders under FOP will be more variable, hence using scheduled ordering policies can more effectively reduce the demand variability faced by the supplier.
Conclusion
In this paper we examined the effectiveness of two scheduled ordering policies -Scheduled Balanced
Ordering Policy (SBOP) and Scheduled Synchronized Ordering Policy (SSOP) -in a decentralized distribution supply chain. On a theoretical level, we provide easy-to-evaluate conditions under which SBOP (SSOP) will reduce the total supply chain cost compared to the traditional Free Ordering Policy (FOP). Meanwhile, we also mathematically compared the effectiveness of the two scheduled ordering policies. To our best knowledge, this is the first time that explicit mathematical evidence is provided for the efficiency of scheduled ordering policies.
We augment our mathematical results with an extensive numerical study. Our numerical results
show that the mathematical conditions we developed are quite robust and predict significant cost reduction by using SBOP and SSOP. We also find that there was a large number of experiments for which SBOP and SSOP were not effective. However, there is a clear distinction between when SBOP and SSOP worked and when they did not. We observe that the performance of SBOP and SSOP does not change much for different levels of end-customer demand variability, and that SBOP and SSOP are most effective when (i) the supplier has higher holding and expediting cost; (ii) the end-customer demands are highly correlated; and (iii) when the supplier's capacity limit is high.
While the performance of SBOP and SSOP w.r.t. the supply chain parameters has a similar trend, their behavior also complements each other, that is, SBOP is more effective than SSOP for low capacity and high demand correlation and SSOP is preferred for the opposite.
One generalization of the scheduled ordering policies is to have a different fixed shipment quantity in every non-ordering period. It is, however, not clear if the additional benefit of this generalization will justify the mathematical complexity. Another direction would be to study the case where the retailers receive a fixed shipment in every period (i.e., no free ordering periods). While this strategy will completely reduce the demand variability faced by the supplier, the retailers's costs will also become sky high. An obvious problem for this direction would be how to determine this fixed shipment quantity. It is also not clear how much more benefit this strategy will bring.
This may be worth exploring in the future.
In this paper we assume the cycle length is fixed and equal to the number of retailers. However this does not need to hold. We numerically show that the benefit of SBOP and SSOP first increases and then decreases as the cycle length increases. This observation suggests that the performance of SBOP and SSOP (equivalently the supply chain cost incurred under SBOP and SSOP) might be concave in the cycle length. Finding the mathematical evidence of this behavior would be an interesting avenue to explore for future research.
